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Statutory Interpretation as a

Parasitic Endeavor

STEPHEN F. ROSS*

Once again demonstrating the Ricardian advantages of collaborations
between legal scholars truly expert in law and social scientists genuinely
expert in their own discipline, What Statutes Mean is another outstanding
"public-private" partnership between the University of San Diego and
the University of California's campus in that fair city. Perhaps the most
lasting contribution of the article is its effective articulation of a simple
paradigm to view the entire process of statutory interpretation: "Statutes
contain a constitutionally privileged command of the form, 'If you are in
situation X, then you must do Y." 1 From this, it follows that "the
purpose of statutory interpretation is to produce a constitutionally
legitimate decoding of statutory
commands in cases where the meaning
2
of X, Y, or both is contested.",
These interdisciplinary collaborators, henceforth referred to as "DRod and the Tritons" in the playful spirit of McNollgast, 3 are at their
* Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law,
B.A., J.D., University of California (Berkeley). My thanks to Roger Noll and Nick
Weller for preliminary discussions, to Brian Gaines, Abner Mikva, and Charles Tiefer
for "triage" in assuring me my arguments were not completely unfounded, and to my

Penn State colleagues for their assistance during a summer workshop.
1. Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez,
What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessonsfrom Positive Theories of Communication and

Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 957, 958 (2007).
2. Id. at 958-59.
3. McNollgast is clever nomenclature referring to landmark tri-authored
contributions to the legal literature by pioneering exponents of positive political theory,
Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,

The Circumstances of Politics and the Application of Statutes, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 558,
568 n.14 (2000) (reviewing JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999)).
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best when explaining how to Use a variety of social science insights to
facilitate an accurate determination of what Congress meant in enacting
federal laws.4 Their project sails into rougher waters in attempting to
demonstrate that the only proper role for a judicial interpreter is to
accurately discern legislative meaning, and that judicial canons other
than those that accurately generalize legislative behavior are improper.
In this regard, their "core assumption" that interpreters "should restrict
themselves to discerning the legislature's intended meaning"' requires
greater analysis.
The principal theme of this essay is that statutory interpretation is a
project that requires advocates and judges to utilize the insights of three
discrete disciplines apart from law: communications and linguistics to
understand the way that legislative drafters use words to communicate to
others, either in text or in extratextual legislative material; political
science to describe the way that legislators behave in enacting statutes;
and political theory to provide a normative guide for courts interpreting
statutes in a constitutional democracy. Judges, lawyers, and academics
would find the process of interpretation more coherent if they transparently
acknowledged when and how they drew upon these other disciplines in
crafting their work. I apply this theme to make three specific points
about this work and a related one by Professors McCubbins and Rodriguez.
First, in applying communications/linguistics and political science, What
Statutes Mean significantly contributes to statutory interpretation by
demonstrating the foundational flaws and antidemocratic and hypocritically
activist stance of many so-called textualists. 6 Second, their insights do
not logically lead to the conclusion that judges should only ascertain
legislative meaning; rather, there are several reasons why judges should
in some circumstances pursue another approach. Determining when
judges appropriately interpret a statute using other tools requires insights
from the discipline of political theory. Third, I apply the methodology
of What Statutes Mean to McCubbins and Rodriguez's earlier critique of
the judicially created "appropriations canon," agreeing that the case law's
hostility to appropriations legislation is unjustified; however, I conclude
McNollgast's major interdisciplinary contributions to the legisprudential literature
include McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive PoliticalTheory in Statutory
Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994) [hereinafter McNollgast, Legislative
Intent] and McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation,80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992).
4. Because their first "core" assumption is that interpretation "is a project defined
by Article I, Section 7 of the United States Constitution," it appears that interpretation of
state and local law would require another law review article. Boudreau et al., supra note
1, at 961.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 981-86.
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that the canon is actually a defensible generalization about legislative
behavior.
I.
D-Rod and the Tritons clearly and helpfully synthesize basic
insights in communications theory to explain the process of statutory
interpretation as one in which ideas conceived by the drafter are
"compressed" into verbal symbols, and then these symbols are
"expanded" into ideas in the mind of the interpreter. They conclude
that "successful communication ... requires a correspondence between
the way that information is compressed and the way that it is
expanded." 8 Perhaps the best way for novices to appreciate this is with
regard to miscommunications due to mistranslations. I recall a British
graduate student's aghast reaction when I referred to a former colleague
best known for walking around the halls in his suspenders. The British
use the term "bracers" to describe the clothing article that holds up pants;
suspenders are used to hold up ladies' nylons, or "garters" in American
English. To assure this "correspondence" between the drafter's "compression"
and the interpreter's "expansion," the interpreter must have an understanding
of the drafting process. Thus, the insights of political science are essential
to effective understanding of statutes as communications. These
insights can aid the interpreter in identifying reliable communications made
by legislative leaders who, under the rules established by the House and
Senate under constitutional mandate, 9 have been delegated authority
to control the agenda and to weed out unreliable comments made by
others. 10
What Statutes Mean offers a powerful paradigm that significantly
contributes to the corpus of legisprudence. The combination of linguistics/
communication sciences and positive political theory that they offer
demonstrate the need for transparency in the parasitic endeavor of
statutory interpretation. Their paradigm also reveals the hypocrisy in the
current judicial politics of statutory interpretation.
Consider their persuasive critique of the "Whole Act Rule," a
judicially created interpretive canon that presumes that each word in text

7. Id. at 964-66.
8.

Id. at 966 (emphasis omitted).

9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings..
10. Boudreau et al., supra note 1, at 971-73.
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must have new and distinct meaning.11 There is no empirical support
from communications or political scientists for the canon's necessary
assumption that drafters are never redundant. Anecdotally, I recall from
my own experience as a former legislative drafter several occasions
when lobbyists or counsel for other senators sought to add additional
language to a bill, despite my well-considered explanations that their
concerns were fully addressed in the existing language. Faced with the
choice of adding redundant language or having to explain to my quite
busy boss why some other senator or powerful interest group would not
join his bill, I clearly opted for the former. But communications science
is not sufficient; an understanding of the legislative process is also
required. Even though redundancy may be a "key part of human
communication,"'12 the Whole Act Rule and its cousin, the doctrine
against "surplusage,"' 13 may well reflect sound practice in other legislatures.
In parliamentary systems characterized by strict party discipline, legislative
amendments rarely succeed without the support of the relevant minister.
Well-established conventions preclude the minister from approving
amendments until they have been vetted by professional drafters in the
Ministry of Justice, who are trained to remove such problematic syntax
as redundancies.14

The Whole Act Rule is not just wrong, as What Statutes Mean
demonstrates, but systematically wrong. Because its intellectual foundation
remains opaque, some who find the canon problematic, such as the circuit
judge in the case criticized in What Statutes Mean, feel uncritically
bound to accept the canon even though it lacks an empirical foundation. 5
Even D-Rod and the Tritons fall into the muck, erroneouslyZ referring to
the rule as one of the "so-called grammatical canons."' Professors
11. Id.at 983-86. 1 analyze the Whole Act Rule in this broader sense, rather than
the narrower and more descriptive sense of simply requiring that text be understood in
the broader context in which the drafters were writing. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge,
Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory
Interpretation,1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV.990, 1097 (2001).
12. Boudreau et al., supranote 1, at 985.
13. See, e.g., Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990)
(expressing "deep reluctance" to interpret statutory provisions "so as to render superfluous
other provisions in the same enactment"). But see Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
U.S. 244, 257-61 (1994) (acknowledging that petitioner's textual argument based upon
"the canon that a court should give effect to every provision of a statute" "has some
force," but refusing to accept the averred meaning because it was "unlikely that Congress
intended the [disputed clause] to carry the critically important meaning petitioner assigns
it").
14. See Stephen F. Ross, Statutory Interpretation in the Courtroom, the
Classroom, and Canadian Legal Literature, 31 OTrAWA L. REV. 39, 56 n.70 (1999).
15. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 883 (9th Cir. 2001).
16. Boudreau et al., supra note 1, at 983. This is somewhat puzzling in light of
prior work distinguishing between canons designed to improve either specific legislative
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Eskridge and Frickey, in their essential reference appendix compiling
Supreme Court canons, are only a bit clearer, differentiating the Whole
Act Rule from those based on "linguistic inferences" or "grammar and
syntax" and placing it with other canons in a category called "textual
integrity.' 7 This broad use of the Whole Act Rule falls into a wide category
of "normative canons" that reflect judicial views on how statutes should
be drafted, in contrast with "descriptive canons" that actually reflect how
drafters write.' 8
The judicial bungling of the Whole Act Rule is symptomatic of the
lack of transparency among us legal parasites in identifying the host
discipline from which we derive our insights. A quick trip to linguistics
texts would show that humans do not emphasize the absence of redundancy
in communications, and most political observers--either scholars or
practitioners-would readily acknowledge that in American legislatures
redundancy is useful, rather than abhorred. We are then left with
political theory to justify a judicial preference for "textual integrity,"
which might be justified, 9 but tends not to be.
My second comment about their paradigm relates to judicial politics
and the foundations of textualism. D-Rod and the Tritons conclude that
textualism "is suspect, and likely improper, because it entails a method
of expansion that is inconsistent with the legislative compression
process[].,, 20 This claim is far too understated. What Statutes Mean
significantly contributes to the cannonade attacking a critical foundation
of the textualist project, the premise that textualism lessens judicial
21
discretion and promotes effectuation of policy by elected officials.

outcomes or the legislative process and canons that purport to mirror legislative intent.
Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and Statutory
Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 669, 690 (2005).
17. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 97-98 (1994).
18. Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress
Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992).
19. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1037-38 (1989).
20. Boudreau et al., supra note 1, at 983.
21. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14, 36 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of OriginalIntent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 62-63 (1988).
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William Eskridge offers another fusillade.2 2 In a riff on the textualist
bromide that judicial use of legislative history is "the equivalent of
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the
guests for one's friends,"23 Eskridge responds that textualism of the sort
practiced by Justice Scalia "is like looking
24 out over a crowd and finding
your friends already there, preselected."
The textualists' refusal to employ basic insights of communication
sciences reveals that they are not really trying to discern legislative
meaning, but impose their own. A wonderful illustration is Blanchardv.
Bergeron,25 which interpreted the scope of a statute granting attorneys'
fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases. Concurring, Justice Scalia
castigated his eight colleagues for interpreting the statute in accord with
a committee report which approvingly cited the approach taken by three
lower court cases. Assuming that a member of the committee staff or a
lobbyist had drafted the report language, Justice Scalia wrote: "What a
heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her
citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of
the land, thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court
itself."26 Although Justice Scalia disapproved of the majority opinion's
reliance on the committee report, he nonetheless concurred in the judgment,
endorsing the additional justifications that the majority offered to
explain why its ruling was "reasonable, consistent, and faithful to [the
statute's] apparent purpose. ,,27 In other words, Justice Scalia concluded
that fees should be awarded based on what judges thought was a
reasonable standard, rejecting the only evidence as to what the legislature
thought was a reasonable standard. Although criticized during her
confirmation as a beacon of liberal activism, 28 Judge Patricia Wald
asked, in regard to this same question, whose meaning of the text should
matter:
Which, then, is the best source: 1) the ruminations of an article III judge who
has turned away from legislative materials to discern independently a "pattern"
or a "reasonable purpose" in a statute in order to shed light on an issue that the
statutory language itself fails to clearly settle; or, 2) the admittedly non-binding,

22. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041
(2006) (reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006)).
23. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
24. Eskridge, supra note 22, at 2073 n. 116.
25. 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
26. Id at 99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 100.
28. Judge Wald was among a group of President Carter's judicial nominees
criticized by Senator Orrin Hatch as "avant garde liberal activists who will legislate from
the bench." Carter'sAppointees Examinedfor Clues on Supreme Court Possibilities,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1980, at A20.
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but often illuminating, declarations of a House or Senate report explaining what
the committee thought it was doing, or the speech of a bill's sponsor in which
the sponsor declares his or her objectives in introducing the legislation? Given
a choice, 2I9 would pin my hopes for fidelity to the "intentions of Congress" on
the latter.

According to What Statutes Mean, an express statement in a committee

report that identified judicial precedents as illustrative of the drafters'
meaning is reliable. There would be significant consequences to members
and the staffers they employ if the cases cited in the committee report
did not accurately reflect the majority's approach to the legislation. And
what better way for a lawyer-drafter to communicate meaning to a
judge than to provide three precedents rather than try to summarize
their meaning in narrative text? As Professor Arthur Corbin argued in
the context of the interpretation of contracts, "when a judge refuses to
consider relevant extrinsic evidence on the ground that the meaning of

written words is to him plain and clear, his decision is formed by and
wholly based upon the completely extrinsic evidence of his own personal
30
education and experience."

The verdict on textualism and activism is strengthened when we
consider how, even when textualist judges cannot resolve interpretive
problems via reference to their own personal views as to the plain

meaning of textual language, they substitute judge-created presumptions
for actual evidence of legislative intent. Several empirical studies have
demonstrated that the textualist attack on the use of legislative history
and the materials that D-Rod and the Tritons demonstrate are reliable
in a
and helpful to determine congressional meaning has resulted
31
significant increase in the use of what I call "normative canons.",

29. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
ConstruingStatutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.
L. REV. 277, 305 (1990).
30. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule,
50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 164 (1965).
31.
This theme has played a major role in work by leading legisprudes Jim
Brudney and Jane Schacter, most notably James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005)
and Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and
Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1998). "Reliance on the judicially constructed canons is
especially problematic because it is not clear that Congress, with its steadily declining
proportion of lawyer-members, has any serious awareness of their existence, much less
their specific applicability." James J. Brudney, RecalibratingFederalJudicialIndependence,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 180 n. 113 (2003). Judge Mikva has suggested that during his
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To refuse to utilize techniques that help explain what legislators meant
in crafting statutes, and to substitute for these techniques a personal view
of words' meaning or a judicially created canon consistent with one's
own ideology, are the hallmarks of activism. Some liberal activists
openly acknowledge this. 32 Whether judicial activism is a good idea requires
assistance from the third discipline critical to statutory interpretation,
political theory, a topic to which I will turn next. With regard to those
who publicly criticize activism, Wat Statutes Mean provides an
excellent and thoughtful demonstration that
33 the endorsement of textualist
judges constitutes raw political hypocrisy.
II.
What Statutes Mean extensively applies insights from communication
science and political science to aid in accurately ascertaining legislative
meaning. D-Rod and the Tritons glide over a major problem in
extended tenure in the House, the "only 'canons' we talked about were the ones the
Pentagon bought that could not shoot straight." Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing
Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 627, 629 (1987). See also James J. Brudney, A Famous
Victory: Collective BargainingProtectionsand the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L.

REv. 939, 1028 (1996) (noting instances where courts use avoidance canon to frustrate
original meaning of National Labor Relations Act in favor of nonunion employee rights);
James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes:
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 46-47 (1994) [hereinafter Brudney,
CongressionalCommentary] (noting increased Congressional overrides of Supreme Court
decisions that ignore legislative history in favor of judicially created canons); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE
L.J. 331, 347-48 (1991) (concluding that Congress is more likely to override "plain
meaning" decisions than any others, since nearly half of the overrides since 1967 address
decisions in which the primary reasoning was plain meaning or canons-of-construction
reasoning, whereas overrides of decisions based on statutory "purpose" are rare);
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 600-01 (2002) (observing that
legislative staffers do not give canons the same degree of weight that judges do).
32. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J.
1685, 1692-93 (1988).
33. J'accuse only those in the political realm who defend and appoint textualist
judges while assailing "judicial activism." I acknowledge that well-meaning scholars
adhere to the view that textualism is a legitimate "effort to limit the discretion afforded
to judges in statutory interpretation cases because of concerns about the legitimacy of
judicial lawmaking." John Copeland Nagle, The Worst Statutory InterpretationCase in
History, 94 Nw. L. REv. 1445, 1455 (2000) (reviewing WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN
COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999)).

Boudreau

et al., supra note 1, demonstrates why Nagle and his academic fellow travelers are
nonetheless misguided. On the other hand, while Professor Nagle finds normative
canons problematic in terms of excessive judicial discretion, see, e.g., John Copeland
Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L.
REv. 771, 819-21, studies by Jim Brudney and Jane Schacter, supra note 31, show how
textualist judges who are championed as models of judicial restraint by politicians
frequently impose clear statement rules.
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legisprudence and political theory: whether judicial interpretation of
statutes should ever be more than an effort to ascertain legislative intent,
and if so when. Fully utilizing all three relevant disciplines, in contrast,
reveals at least three situations where judges might properly dispense
with an approach limited to their best effort to ascertain legislative
meaning: (1) cases where clues as to meaning are extremely weak (true
ambiguity), (2) cases where changed circumstances cast serious doubt on
the accuracy of meaning as a democratic effectuation of elected officials'
policy preferences (dynamic interpretation), and (3) cases where political
theory justifies a non- or semi-interpretivist stance (constitutional values).
The social sciences of linguistics/communications studies and political
science provide, as D-Rod and the Tritons demonstrate, some excellent
tools in allowing judges to discover helpful clues about legislative
meaning. However, these clues are not infallible. Just as amazing
technological and biochemical innovations in forensic science do not
allow CSI teams to solve every murder, there will be statutes
commanding courts to do Y in situation X when the words used for X are
truly ambiguous and there is absolutely no political or legislative history
to help resolve the specific question whether X covers the case sub
judice. Even when clues exist, they may be conflicting. The political
theory of legislative supremacy that underlies the effort to interpret
according to ascertained meaning has significantly less force when a
judge lacks any real confidence that she has gotten it right.34 As Einer
Elhauge observes, statutory interpretation involves both how courts
should determine the meaning of statutes, as well
as how courts decide a
35
case when it cannot divine a statute's meaning.
A second area where political science and political theory combine to
justify a departure from the pure ascertainment of legislative meaning
arises when circumstances change. The clearest case is reflected in the
"absurd result" rule, dating back to English practice, that authorizes
departure from "plain meaning" when "so applied [the words] produce
an inconsistence, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince

34. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 3, at 23-24, poses some examples
where probabilistic analysis could result in several alternative interpretations, all with .3.49 probability of accuracy. To choose among these alternatives using a constitutionally
based political theory hardly seems contrary to D-Rod and the Tritons' goal of a
"constitutionally legitimate decoding." Boudreau et al., supra note 1, at 958-59.
35. Einer Elhauge, Preference-EstimatingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REv.2027, 2029 (2002).

1035

the Court that the intention could not have been to use them in their
ordinary signification."3 6 Somewhat more controversial is the practice
of dynamically interpreting statutes when the judge is confident that the
enacting legislature did not mean to "do Y in situation X' when situation
X arises in the unforeseen context of the case subjudice.
Embracing the principal/agent paradigm encompassed in D-Rod and
the Tritons' formulation "when in situation X, you shall do Y," especially
in the context of a long-term, repeating relationship between the
principal (Congress) and the agent (judges who serve for life terms),
academic advocates of dynamic interpretation observe that there are
many nonlegal situations when the principal expects the agent to
exercise discretion not to follow literal instructions in the face of
changed circumstances. 37 To a significant degree this reflects either the
actual intent of the enacting Congress, or a general "meta-intent" that
reflects an empirical claim about the general expectation of legislators.
As to both claims, science and theory play a role. I am reminded of a
wonderful insight shared with my Statutory Interpretation students by
eminent Circuit Judge Levin Campbell, who served as a Massachusetts
state legislator and state judge before appointment to the federal bench.
Judge Campbell reported that as a state judge he adopted a strict and
literal approach to statutory interpretation; absent a complete travesty of
justice, he applied the words of the text without regard to context, and
made it a practice to correspond frequently with his former legislative
colleagues, confident that outmoded statutes would be appropriately
revised. In later years he became convinced that, in contrast with his
understanding of the legislative process on Beacon Hill, the difficulties
in passing reform legislation through the United States Congress were so
great that he could not presume that outmoded legislation would be
updated, and that some form of dynamic interpretation was necessary.
Likewise, Circuit Judge Jon Newman is inclined to construe legislation
that is reviewed frequently by Congress, such as tax law, quite literally,
while favoring a broader approach to foundational statutes unlikely to be
amended like the nineteenth-century civil rights statutes.3 8
Although the problem of outmoded statutes is significantly ameliorated
by the presence of administrative agencies that can update the statute,39
36. River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, [1877] 2 App. Cas. 743, 764-65 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.).
37. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319
(1989).
38. Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy
ofInstitutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REv. 200, 209-10 (1984).
39. Absent text or reliable legislative history demonstrating that Congress had
considered the "precise question at issue" in the case, federal courts are supposed to
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the same issue arises with statutes that require interpretation without the
benefit of intermediating agency determinations. When political science40
suggests either a specific intent that judges enforce the statute in accordance
with legislative purpose or a general intent that judges do so, insisting on
an interpretation in accordance with original legislative meaning cannot
be justified by logic or by labeling the judicial role as a "core assumption."
It needs to be justified by a political theory, to which this essay now
turns.
D-Rod and the Tritons only slightly embellish their claim that judges
should seek only to ascertain legislative meaning by citing the reverential
Federalist No. 78, where Alexander Hamilton famously wrote that the
judiciary was the "least dangerous" branch because, lacking power over
the sword or the purse, udges "have neither FORCE nor WILL, but
merely judgment . . . .4
In defending the authority of the judiciary to
refuse to enforce laws repugnant to the Constitution, Hamilton conceded
that judges might be able to "substitute their own pleasure" for the
"constitutional intentions of the legislature," but to do so would be highly
inappropriate.42 Judges should "declare the sense of the law; and if they
should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the
consequence would equally
be the substitution of their pleasure to that
43
of the legislative body.
But there is significantly more to FederalistNo. 78. Expounding on
his views of what constitutes appropriate "judgment" in contrast to the
inappropriate imposition of judicial "will," Hamilton wrote:
But it is not with a view to infractions of the constitution only that the
independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humours in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than
to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and
partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance

defer to any reasonable agency interpretation. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). When unforeseen circumstances intervene, the
intentional question that judges need to answer-aided by political science-is whether
the drafters preferred literal enforcement until Congress had the opportunity to review
the issue or preferred a sensible updating by the delegated agency. See, e.g., Regions
Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 460 (1998) (deciding Congress more likely preferred
"the Secretary's exercise of authority to effectuate the Legislature's overriding purpose"
rather than "[e]rror perpetuation until Congress plugged the hole").
40.
1 include here the analysis of past political science, recognizing that experts in
this regard are often housed in departments of history.
41.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
42. Id. at 416.

43.

Id.
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in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not only
serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been
passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them;
who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention are to be
expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled by the very
motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a
circumstance calculated to have more influence upon the character of our
governments, than but few may be aware of. The benefits of the integrity and
moderation of the judiciary have already been felt in more states than one; and
though they may have displeased those whose sinister expectations they may
have disappointed, they must 44have commanded the esteem and applause of all
the virtuous and disinterested.

Bill Eskridge has identified one of the cases where the "benefits of the
integrity and moderation of the judiciary have already been felt" in a
contemporarily famous lawsuit argued by none other than Alexander
Hamilton himself, Rutgers v. Waddington.45 The action was a writ of
trespass brought by a patriot whose property had been seized during the
Revolutionary War by the British and then handed over to two
loyalists. 46 The loyalists relied on the common law defense that use of
abandoned property was justified in time of war when authorized by
military authorities. 7 The patriot demurred in reliance of a recent New
York statute designed to disallow the common law defense when arising
out of the British occupation.4 8 Hamilton denounced the statute as contrary
to the law of nations as incorporated in the New York constitution and
the state's common law. 49 The judge, "mitigating the severity and

confining the operation of' what Hamilton called "unjust and partial
laws," refused to apply the statute and upheld the loyalist's defense. 50
As Eskridge recounts:
Paraphrasing Blackstone, the court insisted that judges were required to apply
unreasonable statutory directives, so long as they were "clearly expressed, and
the intention manifest," but when generally worded statutes yield unreasonable
results in particular cases, courts are at liberty to "expound the statute by
equity." The opinion recast the legal issue as whether the legislature clearly
intended to revoke the law of nations and create a clash with the treaty of peace.
"The repeal of the law of nations, or any interference with it, could not have
been in contemplation, in our opinion, when the Legislature passed this statute;
and we think ourselves bound to exempt that law from its operation . -51
5..

44. Id.at416-17.
45. Opinion of the New York Mayor's Court, Aug. 27, 1784, reprinted in I THE
LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 393-419 (Julius Goebel Jr. ed., 1964),
describedin Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1025-26.
46. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1025.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1025-26.
49. Id. at 1027.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1026 (footnote omitted).
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It does not require political scientists of the caliber of Boudreau, Lupia,
and McCubbins to discern the New York legislature's choice between
rigorously respecting the law of nations and allowing loyalists to profit
at the expense of patriots during British occupation.
Decisions by independent magistrates to mitigate the effects of unjust
and partial laws is not a matter of political science but of political theory.
In this case it is about why the benefits of adherence to principles of
international law justifies, even in a democracy, judges putting their
thumb on the scale by increasing the difficulty of passing legislation
contrary to international norms. It is beyond the scope of this essay to
debate the validity of this theory, or the propriety of other "clear statement
rules" grounded in norms derived from the Constitution. 2 The claim
here is that the purposes of sound jurisprudence in a democracy are best
served when the theory is transparently debated and argued.5 3 Lawyers
and judges should debate whether judges should apply an interpretive
canon requiring certain kinds of meaning to be explicit, and whether
such a canon is appropriate in the particulars of the case subjudice. By
the same token, the claim that clear statement rules are never appropriate
is plausible, but it too reflects a political theory that, contrary to Hamilton's
view in the eighteenth paragraph of FederalistNo. 78 quoted above, judges
should not, absent a clear inconsistency with constitutional mandate,
provide an "essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill
humours in the society" reflected in "unjust and partial laws."

52. These include the presumption of innocence (the rule of lenity in criminal
cases), equal protection (the "Carolene canon" that construes ambiguous statutes in favor
of discrete and insular minorities unable to participate equally in the political process),
and federalism (the currently fashionable practice of construing federal statutes to

preserve state prerogatives and state statutes).
53. Rehearsing a rich debate about judicial candor is also beyond the scope of this
essay. The strongest argument against candor, Nicholas S. Zeppos, JudicialCandor and
Statutory Intepretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 406 (1989), focuses on the public perception
of legitimacy if judges were candid about more dynamic techniques of interpretation.
Even accepting Zeppos's argument, it is not clear that transparency in grounding judicial
holdings in linguistics, political science, or political theory raise the same public perception
problems. And forcing judges to transparently justify "normative canons" that trump
likely legislative meaning would seem to improve public legitimacy. I note that the
progenitor of the concept of dynamic interpretation argues for increased candor. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1543, 1546
(1987); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes,
Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 558 n.l 17 (1992); David L.
Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987).
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A second way in which political theory is necessary to determine
whether or not interpreters should ascertain actual legislative meaning
arises in the context of a conflict between the apparently plain meaning
of a statute and seemingly reliable legislative history that suggests a
contrary intent. Most judges believe that when careful consideration
the text.54
reveals no textual ambiguity, they are bound to give effect to
Social scientists are likely to ask the highly relevant question with regard
to this apparent conflict: Why would legislators use clear text and then
create evidence of a contrary intent? Textualists often presume that the
contrary legislative history is a red herring.5 5 Indeed, political science
insights can often provide the tools that can explain why the contratextual
evidence is in fact not very reliable. At other times the political history
seems to clearly and reliably demonstrate that the legislative intent is
contratextual. Some courts will give effect to this intent, especially where
the statute was hastily drafted, while other judges insist on giving effect
to last minute textual additions that clearly do not reflect the legislative
bargain.56 A judge drawing on communications science will readily
understand that people do not always mean what they say. The example
I use in class is that of a parent who will not hesitate to punish a child for
refusing to come when called, if the child is the only one in the house
and knows she is being called, even if she is being summoned by her
sibling's name. A judge drawing on political science will readily understand
that deals are often made and reflected in the legislative history without
the appropriately careful revision of text that would have occurred if
time permitted careful drafting. I have previously argued that persuasive
and reliable evidence that the legislature attached a meaning to the text
different than the one held by the court would seem to be prima facie
evidence that the text's meaning is not plain.5 7 What justifies the strong
judicial view that text is all that matters is not that textualists actually
believe that each legislator pores over the text while ignoring committee
reports and other relevant legislative history. For textualists, political
history is disregarded because of political theory, not political science.

54.
ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 10 (1997).

55.

See Justice Scalia's critique of legislative history in Blanchard v. Bergeron,

489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
56.

Compare Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d 583, 587-88 (1st Cir. 1986) (departing from

literal interpretation that would allow spouse to discharge a debt that historically was
nondischargeable, in light of absence of congressional intent and harried drafting
process), with In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1989) (giving effect to
literal language regarding transition provisions of Bankruptcy Act, despite evidence that
language was contrary to purpose and specific legislative intent and relevant provision
was inserted during last minute conference).
57.
Ross, supra note 14, at 63.
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Judges give effect to text because that is the way judges think the
legislative process should work.
Finally, parasitic interpreters can draw on both political science and
political theory to craft canons that enhance our constitutional democracy
by facilitating the sort of deliberative political process the Constitution
envisions. As Einer Elhauge has observed, a number of canons are both
explicable and justified as "neither efforts to divine statutory meaning
nor attempts to further judicial or legislative preferences, but rather reflect
default rules designed to elicit legislative preferences under conditions
of uncertainty. 58 Fully consistent with the principal thrust of What
Statutes Mean, Elhauge argues that the best way to assure successful
ongoing communication between Congress and the courts is for statutes
to be interpreted by use of default rules designed to "provoke a legislative
reaction that resolves the statutory indeterminacy" when (1) the actual
meaning of the enacted legislation is unclear, (2) it is much more likely
that the legislature will react to judicial adoption of one party's proposed
interpretation than the other's, and (3) the interim costs inflicted by the
adopted rule are acceptable. 59 Elhauge's approach invokes the parasitic
nature of statutory interpretation. It is grounded in political theory that
views overcoming antidemocratic obstacles to ongoing review of political
choices by current elected officials as a good thing; and political science
which recognizes that existing statutes may not reflect current policy
preferences because of countermajoritarian veto gates. Implementation
requires application of (1) linguistics and communications science, but
only if techniques such as those offered by D-Rod and the Tritons,
McNollgast, et al. do not yield a confident estimation of the meaning of
the original communication; and (2) political science, as ruling for one
side is predicted to facilitate congressional focus on the issue, resulting
60
in new legislation that accurately reflects modem policy preferences.

58. See Elhauge, supra note 35, at 2165.
59. Id. at 2165, 2166. These default rules are a function of a variety of obstacles
and veto gates that make the passage and interpretation of federal legislation so
interesting. In Judge Campbell's perhaps idealized view of the Massachusetts Legislature, see

supra text accompanying notes 37-38, preference eliciting rules are not necessary; all
that is necessary to get the desired response is a letter from a judge. Such is clearly not
the case with Congress.
60. Elhauge, supra note 35, at 2168 n.9, acknowledges that his approach was
"inspired" by Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). This is significant in light
of McNollgast's express reliance on the economics of contracting with regard to the
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The ill effects of nontransparent parasitic behavior by judicial and
academic interpreters are reflected in both case law regarding the
appropriations canon and its criticism in another major article by two of
What Statutes Mean's authors, Mat McCubbins and Dan Rodriguez.61
The canon in question is a clear statement rule that requires express
textual support in appropriations legislation for changes in substantive
legislation. Opaque reasoning in judicial decisions led courts to what
McCubbins and Rodriguez demonstrate is the erroneous conclusion that
the use of appropriations legislation to make changes in substantive
legislation is a bad idea that should be discouraged by judges through the
use of a normative canon. However, this insightful critique appears to
overstate positive political science insights about the role that legislators
actually intend to give to their colleagues serving on the powerful
Appropriations Committees. Specifically, the desirability vel non of enacting
substantive legislation as part of the appropriations process does not
address an alternative justification for the appropriations canon, that
nontextual legislative history reflecting the deliberations of the Appropriations
Committee and the intent of appropriators is not reliable evidence of
what the vast majority of nonappropriators intend with regard to specific
substantive legislation that, under House and Senate rules, would ordinarily
need to be considered by another committee.
Judicial precedent requires a clear statement to effect congressional
policy decisions if the chosen means is substantive legislation contained
in a statute originating from the House or Senate Appropriations Committee.62
Courts base their antipathy to this particular legislative strategy on an
almost casual judicial perception that substantive legislation originating in
appropriations committees is less likely to be well considered.6 3 McCubbins
and Rodriguez largely debunk these arguments.64 Using political science,
they demonstrate that the appropriations process is no more or less
deliberative than the process by which substantive legislation is enacted.

application of positive political theory to statutory interpretation. McNollgast, Legislative
Intent, supra note 3, at 9.
61. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16.
62. Id. at 676-85 (citing, inter alia, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
63. Id. at 686-90.
64. I put to the side the plausible argument that, as a matter of political science, the
complexity of the must-pass nature of appropriations legislation makes it an easier target
for special interests and that as a matter of political theory, judges should interpret
statutes in a manner to counter collective action problems recognized by public choice
theory. If this argument is valid, then it would justify a broader Carolenecanon in favor
of politically powerless minorities, regardless of whether the affected legislation was part
of an appropriations measure.
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They then use political theory to argue that there is no basis for a judicial
preference that Congress enact legislation in any particularly deliberative
way.65 However, courts and commentators appear to have overlooked an
alternative justification for the appropriations canon as a legitimate
effort to discern legislative meaning.
The leading case is Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, where Congress
appropriated substantial sums for a major dam and hydroelectric project
66
whose construction allegedly violated the Endangered Species Act.
The Supreme Court held that the project violated substantive law, and
that the declaration in Appropriations Committee reports that the project
should proceed was not sufficient to displace the text-based conclusion
that the program was repugnant to substantive law.67
First, the Court observed that the language of the Endangered Species
Act plainly required that any federal agency action "authorized, funded,
or carried out by them [did] not jeopardize the continued existence" of
an endangered species or "result in the destruction or modification of
habitat of such species. 68 Although the government and dissenting
Justice Lewis Powell contended that this language was ambiguous,
capable of being interpreted as applying only to the initial decision to
commence a project, the Court observed that no evidence was offered to
support this alternative meaning other than Justice Powell's own declaration
that it was so. Insightfully referring to Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty,
the majority thus recognized that a textual approach allows judges to
declare a statute to mean whatever they want it to mean,49 and so
concluded that the "language, structure, and history" of the Act demonstrated
that Congress intended species protection to be a top priority, and this
reading was consistent with the application of the Act to block the

65. They note that the Appropriations Committee is the largest and most representative
committee, whose very jurisdiction attracts the attention of the most number of
stakeholders. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 695. Appropriations bills are
more likely to be amended, id. at 697, and the bargaining process necessary to achieve
sufficient votes to pass appropriations bills results in more deliberation than may occur
with substantive legislation. Id. at 701-07.
66. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).

67. Id. at 172-74.
68. Id. at 160 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)) (emphasis and internal quotation
marks omitted).
69. Id.at 172-74. "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."' Id. at 173 n.18
(quoting LEWIS CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
LEWIS CARROLL 196 (1939)).
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opening of an almost-operationally complete dam.7 ° Significantly, the
Court relied upon the fact that previous legislation had required agencies
to try to protect endangered species "insofar as is practicable and consistent
with [the agencies'] primary purposes,"37 1 a provision expressly criticized
by environmentalists during committee hearings, and that the Endangered
Species Act expressly omitted such qualifying language.72
The Court refused to be guided by language in the committee reports
of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees explaining that in
continuing to fund the controversial dam, those committees viewed the
project as consistent with the terms of the Endangered Species Act.7 3
The majority reasoned that the general interpretive approach disfavoring
an argument that a subsequent statute impliedly repealed an earlier one
applied "with greater force" to appropriations measures.74 Rejecting the
argument that the clearly expressed view of appropriators contained in
their committee reports was sufficient evidence of congressional intent
to justify an interpretation contrary to the ordinary language of the
substantive statute, the majority observed:
We venture to suggest that the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries and the Senate Committee on Commerce would be somewhat surprised to
learn that their careful work on the substantive legislation had been undone by
the simple-and brief-insertion
of some inconsistent language in Appropriations
75
Committees' Reports.

Significantly, the Court further noted that there was no evidence that
legislators on the substantive committees or elsewhere were aware of the
views of the government or their appropriations colleagues. 76 This
implies that, notwithstanding language in the opinion suggesting that a
textual repeal of substantive law is essential, the result might well have
been different if there was awareness and endorsement of the Appropriations
70. Id. at 174.
71. id.at 175 (quoting Endangered Species Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89699, § 1(b), 80 Stat. 926 (repealed 1973)).
72. Id.at 182 (citing Endangered Species Act. Hearing on H.R. 4758 Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Env 't of the H. Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong. 251, 335 (1973) (statement of Cynthia E.
Wilson, Rep., National Audubon Society; statement of Robert C. Hughes, Chairman,
Sierra Club's National Wildlife Committee)).
73. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 95-379, at 104 (1977) ("It is the Committee's view
that the Endangered Species Act was not intended to halt projects such as these in their
advanced stage of completion, and [the Committee] strongly recommends that these
projects not be stopped because of misuse of the Act."); S. REP. No. 94-960, at 96 (1976)
("The Committee does not view the Endangered Species Act as prohibiting the
completion of the Tellico project at its advanced stage and directs that this project be
completed as promptly as possible in the public interest.").
74. TVA,437U.S.at 190-91.
75. Id.at 191.
76. Id.at 192.
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Committee reports, such as defeat of an amendment to the appropriations
legislation that would have conditioned funding on full compliance with
the Act or perhaps even a colloquy between advocates of the dam project
and leading members of the relevant substantive committee
that indicated a
77
consensus that the project was consistent with the Act.
Obviously, the clear statement requirement of the appropriations
canon would be met if the funding measure had contained language that
the funds should be spent "notwithstanding the Endangered Species Act"78
or, even more generally, "notwithstanding any other provision of law."
When no such statement exists, a range of possible meanings can be
inferred from the fact of appropriation. A decision to appropriate money
for a dam could reflect (i) congressional intent to have the project go
forward notwithstanding any other provision of law; (ii) a considered
congressional determination that the funded project did not, in fact,
violate substantive law; (iii) the unconsidered assumption that the
funded project was lawful, with no reliable indicator of congressional
intent if this assumption were proven false; (iv) a policy judgment that
the funded project meets spending priorities, but should proceed only if
it were separately determined that the project was lawful.
Political science can aid in determining whether any of these
alternatives are more or less probable. The Court properly found it
significant that each house's internal rules disfavored the enactment of
provisions of substantive law as part of appropriations legislation. 79 In
77.

Cf WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 1013-19 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing litigation
involving the application of an easement-granting proviso in the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980), to forest land in
Colorado and Montana). In Montana Wilderness Ass 'n v. United States Forest Service,
655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981), the court initially held that the proviso did not extend to
Montana, but reconsidered when it was brought to its attention that a conference report
on the Colorado Wilderness Act explained that the easement-granting proviso had been
deleted from that bill because the matter had already been addressed in the Alaska

statute.
78. Significantly, appropriations legislation funding the Tellico Dam did include a
specific provision appropriating funds to carry out the purposes of the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974 "notwithstanding the provisions of section 3617 of the
Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 484)." Public Works for Water and Power Development
and Energy Research Appropriation Act, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-180, tit. 1, preamble, 89
Stat. 1035, 1035 (1975).

79. The Court observed:
House Rule XXI (2), for instance, specifically provides:
"No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation bill, or
be in order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously
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other words, the House Rules make clear that the legislative command
"spend money" plainly means "spend money subject to existing substantive
law" unless the text indicates otherwise.80 Legislative rules and practice
provide a ready means for the majority to work its will in these cases: the
Rules Committee can, when reporting the House Resolution governing
terms of floor consideration of an appropriations measure, explicitly
waive the rule and clearly signal an intent to permit an appropriations
measure to change substantive law. Indeed, this approach is precisely
what Speaker Newt Gingrich did to enable the more loyal Appropriations
Committee to bypass substantive committees to enact a Republican
legislative agenda after forty years of Democratic control.8 1
The appropriations canon does not impose a judicially created
requirement that "Congress must pursue their reform objectives through
the ordinary legislative process, that is, through adjustments to the
authorizing legislation.",82 The canon does no more than enforce the
legislatively created requirement that Congress must reform substantive
legislation through substantive committees absent an explicit rule waiver.
Indeed, giving effect to appropriations that changed substantive legislation
would frustrate House Rules. If the Appropriations Committee had inserted
in text a provision that exempted the Tellico Dam from the Endangered
Species Act, it would have been subject to a point of order; it is not
exactly clear how the chair of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee
could lodge a parliamentary objection to report language.83 Under these
authorized by law, unless in continuation of appropriations for such
public works as are already in progress. Nor shall any provision in any
such bill or amendment thereto changing existing law be in order."
(Emphasis added.)
See also Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule 16.4. Thus, to sustain petitioner's
position, we would be obliged to assume that Congress meant to repeal pro
tanto § 7 of the Act by means of a procedure expressly prohibited under the
rules of Congress.
TVA, 437 U.S. at 191. While the majority party leadership can use the Rules Committee
to secure a rules waiver in order to legislate on an appropriations bill, the entire
membership can also work its will by overturning a point of order. For an illustration of
an unsuccessful effort to pass substantive legislation with regard to the war in Iraq, see
Charles Tiefer, Can AppropriationRiders Speed Our Exit from Iraq?, 42 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 291, 307-09 (2006).
80. I thank Abner Mikva for this observation.
81. See John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, The Republican Revolution and the
House AppropriationsCommittee, 62 J. POL. 1, 19 (2000).
82. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 691.
83. As the Court noted:
When voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate
under the assumption that the funds will be devoted to purposes which are
lawful and not for any purpose forbidden. Without such an assurance, every
appropriations measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering substantive
legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute which might prohibit the
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circumstances, a statement inserted into a committee report of the
Appropriations Committee, which if included in the text would have
been subject to a point of order for violating House Rules, is not the act
of a legislator "acting as an agent for the majority." 8 4 If House leaders
really wanted to exempt the Tellico Dam, the modest cost of explicitly
doing so and waiving the rules could achieve the goal. Therefore, it is
more likely that the report language reflected the House leaders'
tolerance for appropriators scoring political points with special interests
by inserting "cheap talk" report language demonstrating their support for
a contested interpretation of existing law. Thus, in McNollgastian terms, the
House Rules demonstrate both a desire to permit substantive committees
to act as veto gates on changes in substantive legislation 85 and a view

expenditure. Not only would this lead to the absurd result of requiring
Members to review exhaustively the background of every authorization before
voting on an appropriation, but it would flout the very rules the Congress
carefully adopted to avoid this need.
TVA, 437 U.S. at 190-91.
84. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 3, at 24.
85. Id. at 18. McCubbins and Rodriguez believe that Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill incorrectly ascertained legislative meaning, and others believe it was an unnecessary
triumph of formalism over reality. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 15-23
(1986). My analysis suggests that the prompt overturning of the Court's decision,
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982)), doubtless required Tellico Dam advocates to pay some
political price to secure the acquiescence of environmentalists on the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee, which is exactly the design of the House Rules in giving the
substantive committee exclusive jurisdiction over substantive law. Indeed, the statute
was strongly supported by the Tennessee congressional delegation and was part of a
political deal to obtain a three-year authorization of the Endangered Species Act. See
Environmental Law Institute, 96th Congress, 1st Session: Environmental Issues in
Limbo, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,009, 10,013 n.54 (1980). A provision in the new legislation
creating a cabinet-level committee to resolve exemption issues may actually have
strengthened the statute because exemptions became so difficult to obtain. See Zygmunt
J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and Its
Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 828 (1986). Cf Brudney, Congressional
Commentary, supra note 31, at 16-20 (describing how new Supreme Court decisions
restrictively interpreting civil rights laws required use of additional political capital that
doomed other legislation that likely would have passed). For this reason, I respectfully
disagree with Bill Eskridge, supra note 31, at 339-40, that the failure to credit the
Appropriations Committee report language is "blinking reality"; while Eskridge is
agnostic on whether the decision and responsive legislation authorizing the dam
"imposed unnecessary burdens on the congressional agenda (which is very limited)," id.
at 340 n.76, I conclude that the burden of passing new legislation is precisely that
intended by the House Rules that designate the Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee as a veto gate. Elhauge, supra note 35, at 2220-21, defends the decision
along similar lines.

1047

that the interests reflected in substantive committees are presumed to be
influential in most legislative bargains. Language in appropriations reports
to the contrary are efforts
86 to evade congressionally designated veto gates
and are thus unreliable.
McCubbins and Rodriguez reach a contrary conclusion, as they read
too much into prior work about the reasons why overall fiscal policies
are delegated to the Appropriations Committees, whose perspective and
composition are more likely to reflect the policy preferences of the
majority party leadership than majorities on substantive committees.
But it is quite a leap in the logic of delegation to suggest that, contrary to
the express design of the rules of each chamber, the Appropriations
Committees are intended to serve as general committees of revision
empowered to update the vast body of statutes Congress has previously
passed. McCubbins and Rodriguez assert that Tennessee Valley Authority v.

Hill "misunderstands the legislative process" 88 in predicting that the
overwhelming majority of legislators who are not members of the
Appropriations Committees acquiesce in allowing their vaunted colleagues
to undo substantive legislation by inserting language in Appropriations
Committee reports. It is with extreme temerity that I dispute a political
scientist of Mat McCubbins's caliber in his own pond, so to speak; I
confess my skepticism draws largely from my own experience as a staff
86. McCubbins and Rodriguez's critique of the district court decision in U.S.
Security v. FTC, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (W.D. Okla. 2003), rev'd in part sub nom.
Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), misses the point in this
regard. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 673-74. In holding that the FTC
lacked authority to create a do-not-call registry, the judge disregarded appropriations
legislation that funded the creation of the registry by the FTC from fees. U.S. Security,
282 F. Supp. 2d at 1292. The legislative history recounted in McCubbins & Rodriguez,
supra note 16, at 671-75, shows that the substantive legislation governing the FTC did
indeed allow such an authorization, and so the judge was properly reversed. If one
accepted the judge's misguided claim that the lack of express authority to promulgate a
do-not-call list precluded the FTC's doing so, and his further misguided claim that a
specific statute, the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6101-08 (1994), did not create sufficient authority, then I do not believe that
appropriations for unauthorized activities should suffice to effectively expand the FTC's
jurisdiction.
Consider instead a closer debate about FTC authority: its contested authority to
regulate the commercial activities of nonprofit organizations designed to serve the profitseeking interests of their members. The Supreme Court held in CaliforniaDental Ass'n
v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999), that the FTC had such jurisdiction, although the issue
was sufficiently in doubt to require a grant of certiorari. Id. at 764-65. In my view, the
inclusion in the legislative history of the FTC's 1998 appropriations of comments by the
House and Senate committees that a portion of the FTC's funds should go to
investigating anticompetitive practices of nonprofit professional associations should not
have been particularly relevant to the Court's determination of the issue. See id. at 768-69.
87.
D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINs, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 132-33 (1991).

88.
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attorney for a substantive committee (Senate Judiciary), but for scholarly
purposes I will limit my argument to an assertion that the political
science literature cited in Canonical Construction simply does not
demonstrate their claim. 89 They argue that substantive committees are not
representative of the entire chamber, and that the ability of substantive
committees to achieve undesired policy outcomes is inhibited by the
Rules Committee, the majority party leadership, and the need for many
policies to receive adequate funding to be effectuated, thus requiring
support from appropriators. But they acknowledge that veto gates exist that
can frustrate passage of policies that may well attract majority support. 90
Curiously, they fail to reach the conclusion that among the veto gates are
substantive committees, and that each house's rules are expressly
designed to make it difficult, albeit not impossible, for a chamber's
majority (much less the tacit acquiescence of the majority to the views of
a majority of appropriators) to work its will over the objection of the
relevant substantive committees. 9' It is unclear why and on what evidence
we are now supposed to conclude that the House leadership believe this
89. See, e.g., infra note 94.
90. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 700-01. Substantive committees
are archetypical veto gates if we accept the definition by the concept's originators: a
person or committee whose actions can significantly affect the course of legislation,
most importantly by imposing costs on subsequent decisionmakers seeking to reverse
their policy choices. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 3, at 7.
One can certainly imagine a legislature designed to enhance majority party
91.
control by allowing the Speaker to appoint members of the fiscal committee and giving
such a committee revision powers over substantive legislation before the bills went to the
floor. Indeed, this describes the California legislature. WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., LEGISLATURE:
CALIFORNIA'S SCHOOL FOR POLITICS 28-29 (1982). As McNollgast observed: "[T]he
legislature can choose a degree of difficulty for changing a policy bargain through its
choice of institutional rules and structures." McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra
note 3, at 11. Thus, successful legislation must pass through numerous veto gates:
"[A]greement must be reached among House and Senate committees, the majority party
leadership in both chambers, majorities in both chambers, and the president." Id.
(emphasis added).
The accuracy of the appropriations canon as a means of preserving desired veto gates
should not be confused with periodic moves to enhance the effectiveness of the
Appropriations Committee as a veto gate as well. Thus, over its history the House has
created a notable exception to the ban on substantive legislation on appropriations
legislation (the so-called Holman Rule) when the effect is to limit expenditures. See
KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 87, at 66-71. This does not, as claimed, "erase[] the
boundary between the jurisdiction of Appropriations and that of other House committees."
Id. at 66. Certainly, where the Appropriations Committee desires to spend money on
programs that violate substantive law, such as the Tellico Dam, the exception would not
apply. Rather than allowing an evisceration of the substantive committee's veto powers,
it simply adds another veto gate.
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degree of difficulty is so great that party leaders should now be able to
easily amend substantive law by securing favorable language in an
Appropriations Committee report. 92 Although McCubbins and Rodriguez
demonstrate that "the intra-Congressional structure of policymaking
delegation and control works as effectively in the appropriations process" as
in the process of enacting substantive legislation, 93 this does not support
the claim that report language or other indicia of the views of key
appropriators are reliable in determining whether
appropriations
94
legislation was intended to supplant substantive law.
92. Even at the apex of leadership control under Speaker Newt Gingrich, reflecting
an expressed desire to achieve the majority party agenda by using appropriations
legislation to secure changes in substantive law by evading the veto gates of the
substantive committees and President Clinton, the leadership used express waivers
proposed by the Rules Committee to effectuate these changes. Aldrich & Rohde, supra
note 81, at 7-22.
93. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 701.
94. In connection with its claim that TVA "misunderstands the legislative process"
in its solicitude for the turf-protecting interests of substantive committees, McCubbins &
Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 698-701, also cites two other political science resources:
GARY W. Cox & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN

83-135 (1993) (miscited in McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 700
n. 117) and Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, Agenda Power in the U.S. House of
Representatives, 1877-1986, in PARTY, PROCESS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS 107 (David W. Brady & Mathew D.
McCubbins eds., 2002). Each discusses positively (and implicitly normatively) how and why
party leaders control the legislative agenda. See, e.g., Cox & MCCUBBNS, supra, at 83;
Cox & McCubbins, supra, at 110. Neither of these sources demonstrates the claim that
party leadership control over the work of substantive committees is so strong that House
members do not want the substantive committees to serve as veto gates, or that it is too
costly to impose the burden on party leaders and their agents on the Appropriations
Committee of expressly repealing substantive law and getting a waiver from the Rules
Committee.
Some prior work suggests a normative hostility to rules designed to preserve the veto
power of substantive committees, which are less representative of the entire chamber
than the party leadership or appropriators. See, e.g., KIEWIET & MCCUBBUNS, supra note
87, at 12, 239 n.4 (noting that detailed rules limiting jurisdiction of Appropriations
Committee to preclude substantive legislation is "ironic" because "Congress has
attempted to establish through a web of tradition and precedent a distinction that cannot
be made in principle"). Consistent with the thesis of this essay, McCubbins and
Rodriguez are of course free to make a transparent normative argument that courts
should give effect to unreliable legislative history in the form of Appropriations
Committee report language on the grounds that unrepresentative substantive committees
should not serve as veto gates and judges should facilitate the process by which their
work can be easily evaded. However, McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, does not
seek to make this argument. With similar opacity from the opposite perspective, see
Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281,
296-97 (1989). Farber praises the Court's decision as faithful to legislative supremacy,
while arguing that the effect of a contrary result would be to require careful scrutiny by
all members of all Appropriations Committee reports, which "would have undesirable
effects on the legislative process" and would "merely invite special interests to abuse the
appropriations process as a means of undercutting substantive legislation." Id. at 296.
Responding to Ronald Dworkin's claim that legislators who voted to enact the
THE HOUSE
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What Statutes Mean is an important contribution to the literature. Its
contributions are somewhat obscured, however, by the lack of transparency
in the interpretive approach the authors take, an opacity widely shared
by judges and academics. Clearly recognizing that statutory interpretation
requires lawyers to borrow from linguistics and communications sciences,
positive political science, and normative political theory will improve
the quality of reasoning that underlies the interpretive effort. Such
transparency reveals that judicial textualists, who prefer their personal
views on the meaning of a text to insights from communications and
political sciences about what legislative drafters actually meant, are
activists effectively replacing legislative judgments with their own. It
also shows that a variety of political theories can in some cases justify
the displacement of the search for actual legislative meaning. Applying
these insights to the prior work by two authors of What Statutes Mean
suggests that judges should not narrowly construe appropriations
legislation because of a hostility to the use of such legislation to reform
substantive law, but may properly refuse effect to textual ambiguities or
even clear extratextual evidence of the intent of appropriators about the
meaning of substantive legislation outside their committee's jurisdiction.

Endangered Species Act did not really mean what they said--or, more to the point,
intended judges to apply the statute in a contratextual way (a point belied by the postdecision legislation placing such authority in the hands of a cabinet-level committee),
Farber likewise responds normatively, not positively: "If judges want the legislature to
act with integrity, they must hold legislators to their public positions. Judges must not
allow legislators to use statutes to strike poses, knowing that courts will bail them out
later." Id. at 298 (discussing DWORKIN, supra note 85).
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